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ABSTRACT 
 A new hockey statistic termed the Complete Plus-Minus (CPM) was created to 
calculate the abilities of hockey players in the National Hockey League (NHL). This new 
statistic was used to analyze the Columbus Blue Jackets for the 2011-2012 season. The 
CPM for the Blue Jackets was created using two logistic regressions that modeled a goal 
being scored for and against the Blue Jackets. Whether a goal was scored for or against 
the team were the responses, while events on the ice were the predictors in the model. It 
was found that the team’s poor performance was due to a weak defense and severe 
underperformances by key players. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTORY HOCKEY 101 
 To understand this analysis, it is not important to comprehend all the nuances of 
hockey. It is, however, important to understand key aspects of the game. This section will 
provide the necessary information so that even a hockey novice will be able to understand 
the following report. To begin this introductory course in hockey, we will start with the 
basics.  
 Each team has 5 men on the ice at one time, not including the goalies. The 5 
skaters consist of 3 offensive players (2 wings and a center) and 2 defensive players. Any 
of these players can score a goal at any time. When a player is on the ice, that time on the 
ice is called a shift. Typically a shift lasts about 1 minute and a player can expect to have 
anywhere from 10 to 25 shifts a game. Better players are given longer and more 
numerous shifts than lesser players. 
 A single game consists of 3 periods of 20 minutes each. If a game is tied after 
regulation, the game goes into sudden death overtime where each team plays down a man 
during a 5 minute period. If at the end of the 5 minutes neither team has scored, the game 
goes into a shootout. The two teams take turns sending a skater out onto the ice one at a 
time to try and score against the opposing goalie. After each team has had a total of 3 
skaters attempt to score a goal, the team with the most goals wins. If the game is still tied 
at this point, then the teams continue in a sudden death shootout until a winner is 
determined. 
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 There are also penalties that may be called by the referees during the game. If a 
penalty is called, the guilty player must leave the ice for a determined amount of time. 
Minor penalties are 2 minutes long and double minors are 4 minutes. The team of the 
penalized player must play down a man for this period of time. Once the penalty time has 
expired, the player may return to the ice and the game proceeds 5-on-5. Some penalties, 
such as penalties for fighting, result in a 5 minute penalty being given to each player 
involved in the fight, but the teams continue at full strength. A 10 minute penalty may 
also be given for misconduct and while the guilty player cannot be on the ice for 10 
minutes, both teams continue to play 5-on-5. 
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CHAPTER 2 
SPORTS STATISTICS 
 The world of sports has dramatically changed over the past few years. Statistics 
are being implemented more and more as a better way to determine player ability and 
value. Even sports such as baseball, which has always had a focus on statistics, have 
adopted new measures to calculate how good players are.  
 The most famous example is Moneyball, a book written by Michael Lewis which 
was later made into the movie starring Brad Pitt. This book follows the true story of Billy 
Beane, the general manager of the Oakland A’s. Billy Beane was limited by his owner’s 
unwillingness to spend the same amount of money on players that other teams in the 
league were spending. This of course meant that the Oakland A’s had a distinct 
disadvantage playing teams such as the New York Yankees who had 3 times the payroll 
as the A’s. Billy Beane knew he had to do something differently. That something was the 
use of sabermetrics.     
 For years baseball had been a sport about batting average and homeruns. These 
were the pillars of baseball statistics, the first things anyone looked at on the back of a 
baseball card or when a player came to the plate. Beane realized, however, that these 
were poor statistics for measuring the impact a player had on a game. Instead, Beane 
started looking at new statistics such as on-base percentage and slugging percentage. 
Using these sabermetrics, Beane compiled a team of undervalued players. These players 
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were able to amount to something greater than their sum and in 2002 they made history 
by breaking the American League record for consecutive wins and won the division title. 
 
2.1 HOCKEY SABERMETRICS 
 The advent of sabermetrics, and the success of teams such as the Oakland A’s that 
use these neo-statistics, has opened the flood gates in all sports. Basketball is perhaps the 
sport that uses sabermetrics the most next to baseball, and other sports are beginning to 
follow suit. This has created an arms race of sorts for statisticians to create the next best 
statistic.  
 The usual statistics for hockey are admittedly extremely poor for measuring a 
player’s ability (Gramacy et al., 2013). The number of shots a player takes, the number of 
goals scored, and the number of hits a player has made simply don’t measure ability 
accurately. New statistics have started to become more popular such as Corsi numbers, 
but there are still questions as to the accuracy of such indexes (Vollman, 2010).  
 Corsi numbers (equation 2.1) are based on statistics readily compiled for each  
 
Equation 2.1: 
 
Corsi = (Shots on Target For + Missed Shots For + Blocked Shots Against) –   
(Shots on Target Against + Missed Shots Against + Blocked Shots For) 
 
player. As we can see, this is not so much a statistical model as it is a simple index. Corsi 
numbers assume that the weights are equal for shots on target, missed shots for, and 
blocked shots against. Clearly having a shot on target, i.e. a shot on net, is more 
beneficial than a shot that was missed. Yet Corsi forces these two events to have equal 
coefficients. This index also allows no room for team variation. For example, a defensive 
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team would be expected to have very different coefficients than an offensive team. While 
the Corsi number is a good attempt to improve hockey sabermetrics, it fails to take a truly 
statistical approach. 
 
2.2 THE PLUS-MINUS AND ADJUSTED PLUS-MINUS STATISTICS 
 One of the better common hockey statistics is called the plus-minus. This is 
another simple statistic: a player gets a plus 1 if a goal is scored for their team when they 
are on the ice and a minus 1 if a goal is scored against the team when that player is on the 
ice. This statistic was created to measure player effect better than the usual statistics. The 
reasoning behind this statistic is that while a player may not actually score the goal, they 
may still have an important impact on the play. A player might have obscured the 
goalie’s view of the puck, or perhaps the defense swarmed to that player leaving another 
player open to score the goal. The plus-minus is supposed to measure this effect, but still 
fails to do so with sufficient accuracy and precision (Gramacy et al., 2013). 
 Hockey sabermetrics have taken the plus-minus a step further and created the 
adjusted plus-minus (APM). Statisticians such as Brian Macdonald (2010) have taken 
steps to improve the basic plus-minus statistic by using weighted least squares regression 
to create his version of the APM. The issues with these analyses mainly lie in extremely 
large confidence intervals. Macdonald used fixed effects in his model to estimate player 
contribution and looked at all players in the league. He has failed, however, to attain 
confidence intervals for player effects that are sufficiently narrow. He has later taken 
aims, such as ridge regression, to alleviate this issue, but has yet to succeed in narrowing 
these intervals a substantial amount (Macdonald, 2011). 
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2.3 NEEDED IMPROVEMENTS IN HOCKEY ANALYSES 
 There are many issues with the approaches other statisticians have taken. Most of 
these are the same issue Macdonald has faced in that confidence intervals for player 
effects are simply too wide. A recent paper by Gramacy et al. (2013) used regularized 
logistic regression to take a Bayesian approach to narrowing intervals. This analysis, 
however, used a monstrous 4 years of data to achieve this goal.  
 Another common weakness with other published papers is that they tend to focus 
solely on proven players and perennial All-Stars. Any model, no matter how poor, should 
be able to properly credit these elite athletes as good players. This is not something that is 
hard to do. What is more difficult is to separate the average players from each other, and 
what is more difficult yet is to find undervalued players. This study aimed to do just that.
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
3.1 AIMS OF THIS STUDY 
 The goal of this study was to change the way the common adjusted plus-minus 
statistic is used. All other papers focus on analyzing every player in the league and only 
discuss how that study’s version of the APM correctly labels elite players as elite. While 
this may be interesting from the standpoint of a fan, this approach is not that interesting 
or helpful from the standpoint of a team.  
 Contrary to previous analyses, this analysis focused solely on the Columbus Blue 
Jackets. The Blue Jackets have always been one of the worst teams in the league and 
have only made the playoffs once during their 13 year existence. (They were swept in the 
first round of those playoffs by the Detroit Red Wings.) Needless to say, the Blue Jackets 
have a reputation of blown trades and wasted draft picks, so it may be argued that the real 
issue the franchise faces is incorrectly evaluating players. 
 This study took the novel approach in analyzing the team in the form of the 
following question: “If we were heading into the trade deadline of the 2011-2012 season 
and had been using the models later described in this paper, what changes would we have 
suggested the team make, and were the moves that the team actually made beneficial?”
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3.2 METHODS 
 There are certain statistics that are tallied during a game. For our analysis, we 
tallied statistics for each individual player during every shift when both teams were at full 
strength (playing 5-on-5 during regulation) for the first 40 games of the season. This 
means that we excluded all statistics that occurred during a power play (when a penalty 
had been called) or events that occurred during an overtime period. Eliminating time 
when a power play occurred resulted in about 10 minutes per game being excluded. The 
statistics that we used for the analysis were the following: 
 Goal for (GF): a goal is scored for the team 
 Goal against (GA): a goal is scored against the team by the opponents 
 Shot on goal (SOG): the player in question makes an attempt at scoring a  goal 
 and the goalie is forced to make a save  
 Shot on goal by other player (SOGOP): another player makes a shot on goal 
 Shot on goal against (SOGA): the opponents have a shot on goal 
 Missed shot for (MSF): the player in question fails to score a goal and the goalie 
 does not need to make a save. This means that the player shot the puck wide of 
 the net. 
 Missed shot other player (MSOP): another player misses a shot 
 Missed shot against (MSA): a player on the opposing team misses a shot 
 Blocked shot for (BSF): the player in question has his shot blocked by another 
 player on the opposing team who is not the goalie
 15 
 Blocked shot other player (BSOP): another player has his shot blocked by 
 another player on the opposing team who is not the goalie 
 Blocked shot against (BSA): the player in question blocks a shot made by the 
 opposition 
 Hit for (HF): the player in question makes physical contact with a player that 
 controls the puck, or just after that player had possession of the puck (this is a 
 slightly subjective statistic as it is up to the stat-keeper to determine whether a hit 
 was actually made) 
 Hit against (HA): the player in question was hit by an opposing player 
 Turnover Created (TC): the player in question stole the puck  
 Turnover against (TA): the player in question lost the puck 
There are of course other statistics that are tallied during a game. The statistics that are 
listed here were chosen because the player in question had some effect on that event. For 
example, we did not include whether a faceoff was won or lost. A faceoff is when the 
referee drops the puck between two centers to begin play and each center tries to gain 
possession of the puck. A defensive player therefore does not have an effect on a faceoff. 
 We did include SOGOP, however, because a player may have passed the puck to 
the player who took the shot and therefore does have an effect on that play. This method 
for event selection is not the same rationale used in other papers where essentially every 
aspect of the game is included. Whether a faceoff was won and even where a faceoff 
occurs were considered for model selection in other studies (Schuckers et al., 2011). 
While there may be an argument for including the result of a faceoff, we do not feel that 
the location and other factors are appropriate predictors because they are out of the 
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control of the players. We want to calculate player effect, so we look solely at events 
affected by players. 
 Creating a dataset that tallied the counts for the events for every shift for each 
player was no small feat. We had to use three separate datasets in order to generate the 
final database that was used for the analysis. Using both EPSN.com and NHL.com, we 
created spreadsheets for the time intervals for each of the players’ shifts, the time 
intervals for each power play, and the time that each event occurred. These three files had 
to be created for each individual game. Using SAS, a program was written that used the 
information from these three original files and tallied the counts for each of the events 
previously listed. The events were counted for every shift of every player of every game.  
  
3.3 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
 Using the final database, we used two logistic regressions that modeled whether a 
goal was scored for or against the Blue Jackets using the count for each event per shift as 
predictors (equations 3.1 and 3.2). Backwards selection was used to eliminate  
 
Equation 3.1: 
 
log(odds for GF) = β0 + β1BSA + β2BSF + β3BSOP + β4HA + β5HF + β6MSF + β7MSOP + β8MSA +  
β9SOG + β10SOGOP + β11SOGA + β12TA + β13TC 
 
Equation 3.2: 
 
log(odds for GA) = δ0 + δ1BSA + δ2BSF + δ3BSOP + δ4HA + δ5HF + δ6MSF + δ7MSOP + δ8MSA +  
δ9SOG + δ10SOGOP + δ11SOGA + δ12TA + δ13TC 
 
 
 
insignificant events using a significance level of 0.1. This analysis was performed at 5 
game increments for the first 40 games of the season. As the season progressed, the 
dataset was updated with data from the new games and the analyses were re-run. It was 
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possible, therefore, for the predictors in the model, and the coefficients for those 
predictors, to vary during the season. While BSA, HF, and SOG may have been 
significant predictors for the GF logistic regression for game 10, game 15 may have had 
BSA, HF, SOGOP, and TC as significant instead.  
 While other papers, such as Macdonald (2010) have included players in the model 
as fixed effects (equation 3.3), we chose to eliminate fixed effects from the model and  
 
Equation 3.3: 
 
y = β0 +  β1X1 + … + βJXJ + δ1D1 + … + δJDJ + γ1G1 + … + γkGk + ε 
 
 where:  J = number of skaters in the league 
  K = number of goalies in the league 
  y = goals per 60 minutes during an observation 
  Xj =       1, skater j is on offense during the observation 
                0, skater j is not playing or not on offense during the observation 
  Dj =       1, skater j is on defense during the observation 
                0, skater j is not playing or not on defense during the observation 
  Gk =       1, goalie k is on defense during the observation 
                0, goalie k is not playing or not on defense during the observation 
 
 
 
only use events as predictors. We believe that it is the usage of fixed effects to estimate 
player ability that causes the lack of precision in other studies because we become limited 
by the sample sizes for individual players. If we wished to analyze players throughout a 
season, we could not take this approach due to further decreased sample sizes.  
 What we did instead was take the average count for the significant events for each 
player and plug those means into the two logistic regression models. For example, let’s 
assume that the GF logistic regression model at game 20 was:  
log(odds) = 0.3(MSA) – 0.1(SOGA) + 0.2(SOG) 
To estimate the probability that a goal was scored for the team when Rick Nash was on 
the ice, we would use the average MSA, SOGA, and SOG counts for each of Nash’s 
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shifts. Assuming his averages were 0.1, 0.9, and 0.6 for MSA, SOGA, and SOG 
respectively, we would have the following estimate: 
log(odds for GF) = 0.3(0.1) – 0.1(0.9) + 0.2(0.6) = 0.06 
Our estimate for Rick Nash at game 20 is therefore that there is a 51% chance of having a 
goal scored for the Blue Jackets each time Nash has a shift. This is of course a ridiculous 
estimate and is only just an example.  
 Plugging in the mean counts for each player may seem a bit ad hoc, or that we are 
indirectly measuring player effects. By choosing to only use event counts rather than 
fixed effects for players, we increased the sample size used for the regression and 
decreased the confidence interval widths. We might only have a few thousand 
observations per player at the end of a season using a fixed effects model. By removing 
fixed effects and solely using event counts as predictors, we increased the observations to 
over 20,000 in that same time period.  
 Unfortunately, there were issues encountered with the goodness of fit test for the 
logistic regression models. At certain points in the season, we found that there was a 
sufficient fit for the two models. After a few more games had been played and we ran the 
analysis again, however, the p-values became significant. The goodness of fit would 
change back and forth as more games were played and there did not appear to be any 
pattern or clear reason behind this.  
 Attempts to alleviate this issue were taken using various methods such as 
changing the link functions and using the lasso method, but none of these approaches 
were successful. The lasso method used a similar reasoning as the methods used in 
Macdonald (2011) and Gramacy et al. (2013). Macdonald used ridge regression as a 
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shrinkage model while Gramacy et al. used a Bayesian approach and set a prior 
distribution centered at zero on team partial effects and player partial effects. They 
imposed these priors to “guard from overfit and provide stable estimates of individual 
player effects”.  
 Macdonald was not successful in his ridge regression approach and has yet to 
suggest another solution that might further shrink his confidence intervals. Gramacy et 
al., on the other hand, were successful but as we have already pointed out, that study used 
4 years of data. It was hoped that through using the lasso we would be able to gain the 
sufficient goodness of fit statistics. Considering that the two previous studies were unable 
to do this, it is not surprising that we too failed in this attempt.  
 The following protocol was used for estimating player effects as the season 
progressed in order to fix the lack of fit: if the p-value for the goodness of fit test was 
insignificant, the most current models were used to calculate the estimates using the most 
recent means for each player. If the goodness of fit tests were significant, then the most 
recent previous models that did have a sufficiently good fit were used instead. To attain 
estimates, we input the updated means for each player into the previous equations. 
 An example might make this protocol a bit more clear. Suppose that we are once 
again trying to estimate player abilities for week 20. If we ran a regression for GF and got 
a good fit, we simply plugged in the mean counts for the significant events to attain 
estimates for each player just as we did in the previous Nash example. If the fit was poor, 
however, we would go back to the most recent regression model that did have a good fit. 
For example, while using all the data up to game 20 might not result in a good fit, using 
all the data up to game 18 might. We would therefore use the regression models from 
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week 18, but plug in the updated mean counts from week 20. That way although we were 
using a dated regression model, we were still using updated means. 
 The estimates for each player from the two models reflected the probabilities that 
a goal was scored for or against the Blue Jackets when that specific player was on the ice. 
These two probabilities effectively measured the offensive and defensive abilities of the 
players. Using the estimates for each player, we took the probability that a goal was 
scored for the Blue Jackets and subtracted the probability that a goal was scored against 
the Blue Jackets (equation 3.4). If the resulting probability was positive, there was a  
 
Equation 3.4: 
 
Complete Plus-Minus (CPM) = Probability of GF – Probability of GA 
 
greater chance a goal would be scored for the team when that player was on the ice; if the 
final probability was negative, there was a greater chance a goal would be scored against 
the team. This final statistic was termed the Complete Plus-Minus (CPM).  
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1 RICK NASH: THE FACE OF THE FRANCHISE 
 To begin the analysis of the Blue Jackets, we will first look at the face of the 
franchise, Rick Nash. Rick Nash is a 5 time All-Star, and plays on the Canadian National 
team. While he does have an elite status, he is sometimes criticized for disappearing 
during Columbus games. Looking at Nash’s CPM over the first 40 games, we see that at 
no point does Nash have a positive CPM (figure 4.1). This means that he consistently 
hurts the team. Moreover, there is no trend to suggest that he is at least improving or 
moving towards a positive CPM at a significant rate.  
 Breaking the CPM into its offensive and defensive components, it is evident that 
Nash’s offense does fluctuate during the first 40 games, but overall his offensive play is 
fairly consistent (figure 4.2). His offensive ability has an average probability of a goal 
being scored for the Blue Jackets of about 2%. His defensive play, on the other hand, is 
extremely troubling. While his defense is about as stable as his offensive production, the 
probability a goal is scored against the Blue Jackets is consistently higher (figure 4.3). 
His average probability for giving up a goal was about 3.5%. This is way too high a rate 
and he fails to at least cancel out his poor defensive play with offensive production. This 
is the tale for the entire team as well. 
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Figure 4.1 The CPM for Rick Nash over the first 40 games of the season. Nash’s CPM is always negative indicating that Nash 
consistently hurts the team. There is a slight upward trend but nothing great enough to suggest that Nash would be able to 
attain a positive CPM by the end of the season. 
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Figure 4.2 Rick Nash’s offensive ability is consistent over the first 40 games of the season averaging around a 2% chance that 
a goal will be scored each shift when Nash is on the ice. 
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
P
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
G
o
a
l
 
S
c
o
r
e
d
 
F
o
r
 
(
%
)
Number of Games Into Season
Nash Offensive Ability Over 40 Games
Nash
Team Average
  
 
24
 
 
Figure 4.3 Rick Nash’s defensive ability averaged around 3.5%. This indicates that there is a 3.5% probability that a goal will 
be scored against the Blue Jackets when Nash is on the ice. This is 1.5% higher, on average, than his offensive ability. Nash’s 
poor CPM may be attributed to his poor defensive play.
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4.2 THE STATE OF THE TEAM 
 If we look at the average CPM for the team, we see why the Blue Jackets played 
so poorly. At no point is the average CPM positive and there is great inconsistency 
(figure 4.4). This means that the Blue Jackets as a team always had a higher probability 
of giving up a goal than scoring a goal. This is more evident when looking at the 
offensive and defensive production overlaid on the same graph. Both the offensive and 
defensive probabilities remain approximately the same for the first half of the season, and 
the probability that a goal is scored by the opposition is around a full percentage point 
greater than the probability the Blue Jackets score (figure 4.5).  We can compare this to 
the Maple Leafs, another team who did not make the playoffs. 
 Unlike the Blue Jackets, the Maple Leafs managed to either have their offensive 
production above or at least close to their defensive production over the first 40 games 
(figure 4.6). What this graph tells us is that while the offense consistently scores goals, 
the defense is the reason the Maple Leafs lose games as it is the defenses that worsens as 
the season progresses. In the case of the Blue Jackets, it is the defense that causes them to 
lose games as well. The offense needs to improve for the Blue Jackets, but the majority of 
the blame for the first half of the season falls squarely on the shoulders of the defensive 
play.  
 For both teams, these figures tell the story for the rest of the season. The Maple 
Leafs continued to play at a 0.500 win percentage, coinciding with our CPM after 40 
games, and finished the season 35-37-10. The Blue Jackets also continued their trajectory 
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Figure 4.4 The Columbus Blue Jackets had a CPM that was always negative during the first 40 games of the season. While 
there are evident fluctuations, there does not appear to be an overall trend suggesting a change in the average CPM. 
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Figure 4.5 The offensive and defensive production for the Blue Jackets is plotted over the first 40 games. At no point does the 
probability that a goal is scored for the Blue Jackets become greater than the probability that a goal is scored against the Blue 
Jackets. Both probabilities are also constant suggesting that the current poor performance for the team may be expected to 
continue. 
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Figure 4.6 The offensive and defensive production for the Maple Leafs over the first 40 games of the season is plotted. The 
Maple Leafs start the season well with the probability of a goal being scored for the team being greater than the probability a 
goal is scored against the team. The defensive production worsens as the season progresses and once the team reached the 30 
game mark, the two probabilities were equal.
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towards mediocrity and finished last in the league with a record of 29-46-7. It may be 
argued that the fluctuation at the start of the season for both teams’ CPM values is due to 
a small sample size. This is most likely the case because the trends for each team appear 
to stabilize as more games are taken into account (figures 4.5 and 4.6). If we had 
projected how each team would finish using the data at the 40 game point, we would 
have correctly projected that the Maple Leafs would finish around the 0.500 mark and the 
Blue Jackets would have far more losses than wins.  
 
4.3 SUGGESTED MOVES 
 The biggest adjustment that could easily be made is to give Matt Calvert more 
playing time on a top line. Calvert is a prospect who has had some good playing time at 
the NHL level but plays sparingly for the most part. For the first 40 games of the season, 
Calvert has been one of the best players on the team according to the CPM. As of game 
40, he had an average CPM of -0.834. While that number is still negative, it is the largest 
CPM on the team. Calvert does suffer from a small sample size, but with a team that 
clearly had no chance of making the playoffs, it certainly couldn’t hurt to give a young 
player more playing time to prove his worth. We project such a move would only benefit 
the Blue Jackets. 
 Another move would be to trade both Rick Nash and Derick Brassard. Rick Nash 
was traded once the season ended (we analyze this trade in the next section), but the Blue 
Jackets may have been able to get more value for him if they had made a trade during the 
season instead. Brassard was a first round draft pick for the Blue Jackets and was 
expected to be a staple of the team for years to come, but Brassard ranked 19th on the 
team in CPM over the first 40 games. He hurts the team and while the Blue Jackets may 
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not bring in a huge haul for him, there should be interest from other teams in a former 
first rounder.  
 Another easy adjustment Columbus could make is to change the line 
combinations. The following lines would maximize the goal differential by giving the 
players that have the largest CPM the most playing time. (CPM values are given next to 
the names of the players.) 
 
 
 Line 1: Matt Calvert (-0.834), Antoine Vermette (-0.991), Cam Atkinson (-1.1) 
 
 Line 2: Ryan Russell (-1.11), Ryan Johansen (-1.072), Vinny Prospal (-1.19) 
 Line 3: Sammy Pahlsson (-1.14), Jeff Carter (-1.239), R.J. Umberger (-1.219) 
 Line 4: Derick Brassard (-1.294), Derrick Mackenzie (-1.353), Derrick Dorsett (-1.31) 
 
 Defense 1: Nikita Nikitin (-0.965), Fedor Tyutin (-1.02) 
 Defense 2: David Savard (-1.149), John Moore (-1.247) 
 Defense 3: Mark Methot (-1.293), James Wisniewski (-1.331) 
 
Notice that Nash is not even listed in the suggested lineup. This is because his CPM is so 
low every player listed on offense is a better player according to the CPM. This again 
gives reason to why he should be traded. By getting multiple players in return, it would 
also make more line combinations possible to further maximize the goal differential. 
 
4.4 ANALYSIS OF ACTUAL TRANSACTIONS 
 There were numerous moves made by the Blue Jackets to try and right the ship. 
They got rid of Grant Clitsome, Jeff Carter, Antoine Vermette, Rick Nash, and changed 
their head coach. The question is, were these the right moves? Taking a look at these four 
 31 
players and comparing their CPM values to the team average CPM over the first 40 
games should give a better idea as to whether these moves improved the team. 
 Clitsome was put on waivers just after the 30 game mark. As we can see, he was 
almost exactly average throughout the first half of the season (figure 4.7). The same can 
be said about Carter (figure 4.7). For both these players and for Carter in particular, 
expectations were that they would be above average and in fact leading the team in the 
right direction. As the CPM shows, neither helped the team and both failed to even be 
above average players for the Blue Jackets. 
We can see that Vermette was above the team average and in fact ranked 4th on 
the team for CPM (figure 4.7). It can be argued that he should be expected to rank 4th 
given the amount of money he was being paid. It became clear, however, that the team 
was moving towards rebuilding as they neared the break. If a team is looking to rebuild, 
they must give up a valuable asset in order to stockpile draft picks and prospects. 
Vermette was traded for a 2012 second-round pick, a conditional 2013 fifth-round pick 
and a goalie. The Blue Jackets did get good value for Vermette and it was the right move 
towards building a better team in the future.  
 Then of course we have perhaps the biggest trade in Blue Jackets history. There 
was a lot of controversy concerning whether the GM, Scott Howson, was waiting too 
long or looking for too much to trade Rick Nash. He had 30 goals and 29 assists at the 
end of the season. One would think that he must help the team at least a bit, but the CPM 
says otherwise. Not only did Nash never achieve a positive CPM, he never even got 
above the team average (figure 4.7). If you asked anyone last year who the top 3 players 
were on the Blue Jackets every person would have Nash on that list. That was not reality. 
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Figure 4.7 The CPM values for Antoine Vermette, Grant Clitsome, Jeff Carter, Rich Nash, and the team average are shown for 
the first 40 games. Vermette is well above the average while Nash is far below it. Clitsome and Carter are almost perfectly 
average throughout the first half of the season.
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By trading Nash, the Blue Jackets shockingly improved the team. To get younger players 
that the team can use right away and build around was a best case scenario and it was 
only a question of who those players would be. The two moves of trading Carter and 
Nash were the best moves of the season while the decision on Clitsome was a 
questionable one. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION AND FURTHER STUDIES 
 The Columbus Blue Jackets are anything but synonymous with success. Their 
attempts to make trades or draft players that will change the team’s fortunes have mostly 
been met with failure. Something must be done differently and that something is the use 
of hockey sabermetrics.  
 Using the CPM to analyze the Columbus Blue Jackets, we were able to conclude 
that the poor record of the team during the first half of the 2011-2012 season was mostly 
due to a defense that gave up too many goals and players underachieving. Those players, 
such as Rick Nash, mostly struggled to equal their offensive production with their 
defensive ability. We also found that certain moves made by the Blue Jackets bettered the 
team; moves like letting Grant Clitsome leave on waivers, however, were mistakes.  
 During the current 2012-2013 season, the Blue Jackets have so far shown 
improvement. The players that were acquired for Rick Nash are contributing to the team. 
It is counterintuitive that shipping off a perennial All-Star would improve a team, but just 
as the CPM suggested, that is exactly what has happened. The team is not yet of a playoff 
caliber, so there are still many more moves that must be made in order to reach that point.  
 Future studies should focus on correcting the goodness of fit tests so that the two 
regression models fit sufficiently well throughout the entire season. We may want to 
include effects for opposing goalies and opposing teams. It remains in question whether 
this would greatly improve the model, however, since the Blue Jackets play most of the 
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teams the same amount. It would also be important to study other teams in the NHL to 
see if the same analysis works universally. We could also begin to analyze trade 
scenarios using data from other teams. For example, if we had data for the players that 
came in the Rick Nash trade, we could predict their CPM for the Blue Jackets and project 
if they would contribute to the team even before the trade was made.  
 Using the CPM, it might also useful to take a longitudinal approach to predict 
how players and the team will play later in the season. This could prove extremely useful 
as we could predict whether the team in its current state has a chance of making the 
playoffs. It would also be possible to determine what players on other teams would help 
make the chance of reaching the playoffs greater if they were acquired through trades. 
These improvements would naturally require generalizations of the model explained here. 
 The CPM is a statistic that is team specific and is able to measure how well 
players fit with that team. We can rank the players on a team which should help with 
making minor roster changes. Dropping the lower level players and slowly increasing the 
team average CPM is the way to form a playoff caliber team. We can also project how 
well players on other teams will fit with the Blue Jackets which allows us to determine 
what players are the best to make trades for. The CPM is not a tool for fans to rank 
players in the NHL; it is a tool for a general manager. Just as Billy Beane revolutionized 
baseball with his sabermetrics, we hope that this too can help change the way hockey 
looks at players. All it takes is a general manager who isn’t afraid to think outside the box 
and someone who can think of a better title than “Moneypuck”.    
 
 36 
REFERENCES 
Gramacy, R. B., Jensen, S. T., and Taddy, M. (2013). “Estimating Player Contribution in 
Hockey with Regularized Logistic Regression.” Tech. rep., arXiv:1209.5026. 
 
Macdonald, B. (2010). “A Regression-based Adjusted Plus-Minus Statistic for NHL 
Players.” Tech. rep., arXiv: 1006.4310. 
 
Macdonald, B. (2011). “An Improved Adjusted Plus-Minus Statistic for NHL Players.” 
MIT Sloan Sports Analytics Conference, 2011. 
 
Schuckers, M. E., Lock, D. F., Wells, C., Knickerbocker, C. J., and Lock, R. H. (2010). 
“National Hockey League Skater Ratings Based upon All On-Ice Events: An Adjusted 
Minus/Plus (AMPP) Approach.” Tech. rep., St. Lawrence University.  
 
Vollman, R. (2010). “Howe and Why: Ten Ways to Measure Defensive Contributinos.” 
Hockey Prospectus, March 4, 2010. 
 
Wheeler, G. (2010). “The Lasso Logistic Regression Model:Modifications to aid 
causality assessment for Adverse Events Following Immunization.” London School of 
Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, 2010. 
